“We all thought Richmond, protected as it was by our splendid fortifications and defended by our army of veterans, could not be taken. Yet Grant turned his face to our Capital, and never turned it away until we had surrendered. Now, I have carefully searched the military records of both ancient and modern history, and have never found Grant’s superior as a general. I doubt that his superior can be found in all history.” Robert E. Lee
This quotation graces the back cover of James Marshall-Cornwall’s detailed study, Grant as Military Commander, and Lee’s high praise reflects the sentiment held by this author too. This 1970 book, published by Barnes & Noble, is 264 pages (with maps, illustrations and a few photographs) and is a well-written study of Grant’s military strategy, attitude and accomplishments.
The author, an English general himself, does not attempt to glorify Grant nor does he fail to address the Union commander’s errors and misunderstandings. It is not a puff piece. Nevertheless, Marshall-Cornwall does tend to explain Grant’s failings as being related more to the complicated politics of his position: Lincoln’s re-election, Stanton, Halleck, bad officers like McLernnan and Butler, the need to defend Washington, D.C., etc. Indeed, Grant’s eventual ability to overcome these difficulties which doomed others is part of why Marshall-Cornwall (a biographer also of Massena and Napoleon) respects him so.
As he writes: “The record of Ulysses Grant’s career affords ample testimony to his stature as a Great Captain. He certainly stood head and shoulders above any of his contemporaries and compatriots, including such able commanders as Robert E. Lee, William T. Sherman and Stonewall Jackson. Grant may not have been gifted with any intuitive genius for warfare; there were no lightning strokes, no brilliant flashes, few daring gambles. His success as a commander rested on more solid qualities: fixity of purpose, balanced judgment, imperturbable courage and, above all, sturdy common sense. As Wellington once said, ‘When one is strongly intent on an object, common sense will usually direct one to the right means...’”
“Perhaps Grant’s greatest qualities as a commander were his wide strategic vision and his fixity of purpose. Few of the other leaders of the Civil War could see beyond the range of their immediate battle-front. Grant’s perspective embraced the whole scope of the twin theaters of war, and he was never deflected by purely geographical objectives from his main purpose of destroying the Confederate armies. He had the sense to exploit fully the facilities, first of river transport to further his operations in the western theatre, and later of the Virginian estuaries to keep advancing his supply base to the latitude of Richmond.
His original strategic plan for the encirclement of the Southern armies was masterly, although delayed and partially frustrated by the mistakes of his subordinates, and also by the skill of his major opponent in conducting defensive operations on interior lines. Grant’s three major strategic achievements were the Vicksburg campaign, the outflanking of Lee by crossing the James, and the final tenacious pursuit to Appomattox. None of these could have succeeded without his inflexible determination. As Sherman said of him, ‘He has all the tenacity of a Scottish terrier.’”
Grant as Military Commander by James Marshall-Cornwall is a thorough, knowledgeable and well-balanced study – a good read for anyone interested in this outstanding American.
